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IAS 39 Reclassification Choice and Analyst Earnings Forecast Properties 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In October 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board amended IAS 39 to 
allow banks to retroactively reclassify financial assets that previously were measured 
at fair value to amortized cost. By reclassifying financial assets, a bank can potentially 
avoid recognizing the unrealized fair value losses and thereby increase its income and 
regulatory capital during a market downturn. We examine the implications of the 
reclassification decision by banks for the properties of financial analyst earnings 
forecasts during 2008-2009, when economic conditions were highly volatile. We find 
that the reclassification choice during the financial crisis reduced analyst forecast 
accuracy and increased forecast dispersion. We also find that the observed decline in 
analyst forecasting ability is limited to the year of adoption when the economic 
environment was highly volatile.  
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IAS 39 Reclassification Choice and Analyst Earnings Forecast Properties 
1. Introduction 
Many politicians and bankers have argued that the pro-cyclicality resulting from 
the use of fair value accounting hastened and exacerbated the recent financial crisis. 
Responding to the numerous calls to reduce the use of fair value accounting (Laux 
and Leuz, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010), the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), in October 2008, amended IAS 39 to allow banks to use measurements other 
than fair value for non-derivative financial assets if they have the ability and intention 
to hold such assets for the foreseeable future (IASB, 2008).  This amendment gives 
banks the option to retroactively reclassify financial assets that previously were 
measured at fair value using alternative measurements, and to recognize the related 
reclassification gains and losses in income or in other comprehensive income. By 
reclassifying financial assets, a bank can avoid recognizing these unrealized fair value 
losses and thereby increase its income as well as its regulatory capital during a market 
downturn. 
Given the discretion in non-derivative financial asset reporting afforded by the 
amendment to IAS 39, a question of interest is whether banks use this discretion to 
unbiasedly communicate the assessment of their ability and intention to hold such 
assets for the foreseeable future or to accomplish their earnings and capital 
management objectives. If banks faithfully communicate such information, then 
reclassification of their non-derivative financial assets following the amendment 
should benefit users of financial statements in assessing the future performance of 
banks. Alternatively, if banks distort this information to accomplish other objectives 
(such as capital or earnings management), then the reclassification of financial assets 
adds noise to the information available to users of financial statements. 
  
4 
 
In this study, we focus on the implications of the amendment to IASB 39 for one 
important group of financial statement users, namely financial analysts, because 
financial analysts play an important role as information intermediaries in the capital 
market. By collecting and analyzing information, financial analysts reduce 
information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and improve market efficiency 
(Barth and Hutton, 2004). We examine how the reclassification choice permitted 
under the new accounting rule affects the ability of analysts to forecast earnings in a 
period of high economic volatility. Whereas the information advantage possessed by 
analysts allows them to make superior forecasts (Brown et al., 1987), their success is 
constrained by the quality of the data they use and the level of future uncertainty 
(Graham and Dodd, 2008).  
In an information environment with heightened uncertainty, such as during the 
financial crisis, it is unclear ex-ante whether the information uncertainty associated 
with the decision to reclassify financial instruments increases the complexity of 
analysts‟ forecasting task, or whether financial analysts can use their information 
advantage and superior forecasting ability to maintain the quality of their forecasts. 
Using a sample of international (UK, Continental European, Australian, Asian and 
Middle Eastern/African) banks, we contribute to the literature by investigating 
whether the decisions by banks that reclassify their non-derivative financial assets 
following the amendment to IAS 39 aid or impede financial analysts in forecasting 
earnings.  
Specifically, we investigate whether analyst forecast properties (forecast 
accuracy and forecast dispersion) are systematically related to the reclassification 
choice when analysts issue forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings following the release 
of the actual earnings impacted by the reclassification. Because the IAS 39 
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reclassification choice is an endogenous choice, it is possible that the same factors 
driving the choice may also influence analyst forecast performance. Hence, we 
control for this potential endogeneity by using the Heckman two-stage procedure in 
our empirical analyses. Our results show that analyst forecast accuracy decreases and 
analyst forecast dispersion increases when analysts issue forecasts for the following 
year, immediately after they observe the actual earnings impacted by the 
reclassification. These results hold even after controlling for factors, such as firm size, 
forecast horizon, analyst following, and other characteristics that have been shown to 
affect analyst forecast properties.  
In additional analysis, we investigate whether the decline in forecast accuracy 
and increase in dispersion persists in the post adoption year. Because financial 
analysts are sophisticated players in the capital market, it is ex-ante unclear whether 
the change in the information environment subsequent to the IAS 39 amendment 
continues to systematically impede their ability to forecast earnings. Our results show 
that, in fiscal year 2010 when the economic environment became less volatile, analyst 
forecast properties are not associated with the reclassification choice. This result 
implies that the deterioration in analysts‟ forecasting ability is only transitory in the 
year of high uncertainty when firms made the one-time election in 2008. The 
reclassification choice elected by firms during this period of high volatility creates 
difficulty for analysts in issuing earnings forecasts, but this difficulty tapers off when 
the economic condition improves.   
Our research contributes to two streams of accounting literature: fair value 
accounting choice and analyst earnings forecasts. First, we extend the fair value 
accounting choice literature by studying how the IAS 39 reclassification choice 
affects a subset of financial statement users, namely financial analysts. Prior studies 
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examine the characteristics of banks that reclassify and the factors that influence their 
reclassification choice (Bischof et al., 2010; Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Paananen 
et al., 2010; Fiechter, 2010; Quali and Ricciardi, 2010).  These studies largely provide 
evidence of earnings and capital management motivations when banks reclassify 
assets out of fair value accounting. Unlike those studies, we document the 
implications of the reclassification choice for financial analysts, an important group of 
financial statement users. 
Second, our study contributes to the analyst forecast literature by showing how a 
specific accounting choice (the IAS 39 reclassification option) during a period of high 
economic instability can affect analyst forecast properties. Our research complements 
prior studies documenting that analyst forecasting ability decreases with greater 
economic complexities during stable economic conditions (e.g., Haw et al. (1994) in 
the case of mergers; Plumlee (2003) in the case of tax law changes; Ho et al. (1995) in 
the case of options listing). Our study differs from these prior studies in that we 
investigate the effects of an accounting policy change during a highly volatile 
economic environment on the forecasting ability of financial analysts.  Our research 
provides valuable evidence for policy makers that the reclassification elected by 
banks during the financial crisis period imposed temporary difficulty to analysts when 
they issued forecasts. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We develop the hypotheses in the 
next section, present the research design in section three, describe the data in section 
four, discuss the results in section five, and present our conclusions in section six.  
2. Hypotheses  
IAS 39 requires banks to classify their equity and debt security assets into the 
following three broad categories: held for trading, available for sale, and held to 
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maturity. Loans are classified as “held for trading” and “loans and receivables”. Held-
for-trading loans and securities are recorded at fair value and changes in fair value 
recognized each period in income. Available-for-sale securities are also fair valued; 
however, changes in fair values are not recognized in income but, instead, are 
recorded directly in shareholders‟ equity through „other comprehensive income‟. 
Held-to-maturity securities and loans and receivables are accounted for on an 
amortised cost and accrual basis (IASC, 2009).  
In 2005, banks were given the option to fair value specific financial assets and 
liabilities (such as available-for-sale assets and repos) on an instrument-by-instrument 
basis to eliminate accounting mismatches and to reduce earnings volatility. Although 
the effective date for the fair value option was 2006, banks were given the choice to 
early adopt in 2005 (IASB, 2004). Consistent with the underlying intention of the fair 
value option, Fiechter (2011) finds banks that stated explicitly that they elected the 
fair value option to reduce accounting mismatches experienced a reduction in 
earnings volatility relative to banks that did not explicitly state their intent.  
Other studies propose and test motivations other than efficiency improvement 
for choosing the fair value option for financial securities. For example, using a US 
bank sample, Song (2008), Henry (2009) and Chang et al. (2011) find that early 
adopters of the fair value option do so to manage earnings. Guthrie et al. (2011) find 
similar results for a sample of early adopting international banks.  
Many bank regulators, bank managers, and politicians blame fair value 
accounting for having accelerated the recent financial crisis (e.g., Financial Stability 
Forum, 2009). In response to the excessive pressure and in light of the difficult 
economic climate, the IASB introduced an amendment to IAS 39. This amendment 
allows banks to reclassify financial assets (other than those elected under the fair 
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value option) out of fair value if they have the intention and ability to hold these 
assets. Three possible reclassifications are allowed: (i) from “held for trading” to 
“available for sale”, (ii) from “held for trading” to “held to maturity” or “loans and 
receivables”, and (iii) from “available for sale” to “held to maturity” or “loans and 
receivables”. Prior to the IAS 39 amendment in 2008, there were stringent criteria that 
had to be met for reclassification (IASB, 2008).  
Recent research has investigated the underlying motivations for reclassifying 
some financial assets. For example, Fiechter (2010), Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) 
and Bischof et al. (2010) document that reclassifying banks avoided substantial fair 
value losses, and reported an increase in profitability and higher regulatory capital, 
after the reclassification. Similarly, Paananen et al. (2010; 2011) find that banks with 
more exposures to fair value measurement are more likely to reclassify due to either 
liquidity or capital concerns. Broadly speaking, these studies suggest that banks‟ 
reclassification choice is related to earnings or capital management motivations. 
Our study builds on these prior studies on fair value accounting choice by 
examining how the fair value accounting choice affects the forecasting ability of 
financial analysts. Financial analysts play a prominent role as information 
intermediaries in the securities market (Schipper, 1991). The incentives of analysts to 
make accurate earnings forecasts are well established in the literature. Analysts with 
greater earnings forecast accuracy are more likely to be ranked in Institutional 
Investor (Stickel, 1992; Jackson, 2005), less likely to be fired (Mikhail et al., 1999), 
and more likely to be promoted (Hong et al., 2000). To the extent that financial 
analysts are more sophisticated, have greater ability and aptitude to process relevant 
information and assess the fundamentals of the banks they follow, the reclassification 
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decision by banks during a period of volatile economic environment should not 
severely impede their earnings forecasting ability. 
However, it is also well known that analysts‟ ability to make accurate earnings 
forecasts is lower in an environment of high uncertainty. Analyst forecast properties 
have been studied in a number of contexts that increase forecasting complexity, 
including mergers (Haw et al., 1994), changes in tax law (Plumlee, 2003), options 
listing (Ho et al., 1995), insider trading (Lustgarten and Mande, 1998), and equity 
offerings (Das et al., 2006; Lin and McNichols, 1998). The general finding of these 
studies is that analyst forecast accuracy decreases as forecasting complexity increases.  
On the one hand, the application of the IAS 39 amendment rule during the 
financial crisis period may create difficulties and complexities which affect analysts‟ 
ability to assess a bank‟s true earnings performance. On the other hand, to the extent 
that reclassification reduces earnings volatility created by measuring assets and 
liabilities differently, it can improve the usefulness of financial statements,
1
 which 
suggests that the reclassification decision should aid analysts in their forecasting 
efforts. We investigate whether the decision by banks to reclassify certain non-
derivative financial assets under the amended IAS 39 enhanced or diminished certain 
properties of financial analysts‟ annual earnings forecasts. Ex-ante, it is unclear how 
the reclassification choice would affect analyst forecast accuracy in the financial crisis 
period, hence we state our first hypothesis in null form as: 
H1: The reclassification choice by banks is not related to analyst 
earnings forecast accuracy during the financial crisis period. 
                                                 
1
 Consistent with this argument, Fiechter (2011) finds banks that chose the fair value option under IAS 
39 have lower accounting mismatches and exhibit lower earnings volatility than banks that did not 
choose this option. The accounting rules excluding the fair value option create potential accounting 
mismatches between assets and liabilities. An asset may be marked-to-market while the liability 
funding the asset is accounted for at historical cost. In this scenario, the fair value option allows a bank 
to elect the liability for fair valuation so as to eliminate accounting mismatches between the asset and 
liability. Thus the fair value option, by its nature, is used to reduce accounting mismatches and to 
reduce earnings volatility which is likely to be greater during the crisis period because the differences 
between fair value and historical cost accounting earnings are likely to be larger. 
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Earnings forecast dispersion shows the extent to which analysts disagree on a 
firm‟s future earnings potential. This disagreement arises due to uncertainties about 
the information environment (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992) and the lack of objective 
information that analysts can use to arrive at a consensus on a firm‟s earnings 
performance (Herrmann and Thomas, 2005). The different accounting treatments of 
reclassifications among the different categories of “held for trading”, “available for 
sale”, “held to maturity”, and “loans and receivables”, may create uncertainties among 
analysts on the scale of adjustments they should make to their earnings forecasts, 
especially in a period of volatile economic environment. Ex-ante, for reasons stated 
above, it is unclear how the reclassification choice during the crisis period would 
affect the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Hence, we state the second hypothesis in 
null form as: 
      H2: The reclassification choice by banks is not related to analyst  
earnings forecast dispersion during the financial crisis period. 
  
3. Research design 
3.1. Analyst forecast properties 
 Following prior studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Behn et al., 2008), we 
measure analyst forecast accuracy as follows: 
 
1
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where Accyt denotes forecast accuracy, 
1t
tForecast refers to mean forecast of period t 
earnings made during the period starting three months after the prior year (t-1) actual 
earnings announcement date, Epst refers to earnings per share in time t, and Price t-1 is 
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share price at the end of the prior fiscal year.
2
 We compute forecast accuracy for fiscal 
year 2009, after the release of actual 2008 earnings, which incorporate the effects of 
the reclassifications, but before release of 2009 actual earnings. Thus, our measure of 
forecast accuracy reflects the extent to which the assessment of a bank‟s 2009 
economic performance is affected by the reclassifications in its 2008 earnings.   
We measure analyst forecast dispersion as follows: 
 
1Pr
)(


t
t
t
ice
ForecastStd
Disp  
where Dispt denotes forecast dispersion and Std(Forecastt) refers to the standard 
deviation of analyst earnings forecasts at time t. Similar to forecast accuracy, forecast 
dispersion is calculated for fiscal year 2009.  
3.2. Models for testing hypotheses 
 We estimate the following regression to test the association between 
reclassification choice and analyst forecast accuracy: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11_
Accy IASamend Size Surprise Loss Nana
Fin stability Horizon Stdroe Eps Comlaw Disc
     
      
     
      
        
        (1) 
 where 
Accy = forecast accuracy; 
IASamend = indicator variable that equals one if the bank reclassifies its 
financial assets, and zero otherwise; 
Size = natural logarithm of equity market value;  
Surprise = current year‟s earnings minus prior year‟s earnings deflated by 
stock price; 
Loss = indicator variable that equals one if earnings are negative, and 
zero otherwise; 
Nana = natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the bank; 
                                                 
2
 To clarify, consider a bank with fiscal year-end in December 2008 and whose actual earnings were 
released in March 2009. If the analyst following the bank issues the first forecast for 2009 earnings 
within the three months after March 2009, we use that forecast to compute forecast accuracy. To be 
consistent with the EPS forecast measure, we use actual earnings from the I/B/E/S Detail file. 
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Fin_stability = natural logarithm of (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is 
earnings divided by assets, CAR is capital-asset ratio, and 
σ(ROA) is standard deviation of ROA. ROA and capital-asset 
ratio are calculated as the mean over 2003–2007, and σ(ROA) is 
the standard deviation of ROA estimated over the same period. 
Higher Fin_stability implies greater financial stability; 
Horizon = natural logarithm of the mean forecast horizon; 
Stdroe = standard deviation of earnings over 2003 to 2007; 
Eps = earnings per share; 
Comlaw = indicator variable that equals one if the legal origin is common 
law, and zero otherwise  (La Porta et al., 1998). The common 
law countries include Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, 
South Africa, and UK; the rest are code law countries; 
Disc = Disclosure index reported in La Porta et al. (2006), which is 
based on questionnaire surveys of lawyers in 49 countries on the 
securities laws applicable to an offering of shares listed in each 
country‟s largest stock exchange in December 2000. 
  
 Our main variable of interest is IASamend, an indicator variable that equals 
1 if the bank reclassifies its financial assets, and 0 otherwise. To the extent that the 
reclassification decision reduces the predictability of earnings, we expect to observe 
lower forecast accuracy, suggesting that the coefficient on IASamend should be 
negative. On the other hand, if the reclassification eliminates accounting mismatches, 
resulting in lower earnings volatility (Fiechter, 2011), we expect to observe higher 
forecast accuracy, suggesting that the coefficient on IASamend should be positive. 
 We winsorize all continuous variables (except log-transformed variables) at 
the 1% and 99% levels to remove the effect of extreme values. We estimate equation 
(1) with country-clustered standard errors to correct for cross-sectional dependence 
(Petersen, 2009). We control for other factors that have been shown to affect analyst 
forecast accuracy in prior studies. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), we control 
for firm size (Size), analyst coverage (Nana) and earnings surprise (Surprise). Lang 
and Lundholm (1996) find a positive relation between size and analyst forecast 
accuracy for industrial firms. However, in the context of the current study, larger 
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banks have more complex business operations, which make analyst forecasting less 
accurate. Consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996), we expect wider analyst 
coverage to improve forecast accuracy and larger earnings surprise to reduce forecast 
accuracy. 
We also control for earnings volatility (Stdroe) and accounting losses (Loss) 
because it is more difficult for analysts to forecast earnings of firms with a relatively 
larger change in earnings and with a loss (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hwang et al., 
1996). We include the log of the number of days between the announcement of the 
consensus forecast and the announcement of actual earnings (Horizon) to control for 
the tendency for earnings forecasts to become more accurate as the earnings 
announcement date approaches (Clement, 1999; Brown et al., 1999). As in Behn et al. 
(2008), we control for financial stability of banks (Fin_stability) because financially 
stable firms tend to have more accurate forecasts.
3
 We include earnings per share (Eps) 
in the regression model because Eames and Glover (2003) report that earnings level is 
related to forecast accuracy. We also control for legal origin since Chang et al. (2000) 
and Barniv et al. (2005) find that analyst forecasts are more accurate in common-law 
countries than in code-law countries. Common law countries generally have more 
effective corporate governance mechanisms, including stronger investor protection 
laws and inputs provided through higher-quality financial reporting systems. Lastly, 
we control for disclosure transparency (Disc) because Hope (2003) finds that analyst 
forecasts are more accurate in countries with higher accounting disclosure quality and 
stronger enforcement of accounting standards. 
                                                 
3
 Behn et al. (2008) include the financial distress measure from Zmijewski (1984). We replace this 
measure with the Fin_stability measure from Laeven and Levine (2009), which is a bank-specific 
measure of financial solvency. Fin_stability is calculated as the natural logarithm of return on assets 
(ROA) plus capital asset ratio (CAR)) divided by the standard deviation of return on assets (σ(ROA)).  
Fin_stability is the inverse of the probability of insolvency, with a higher score indicating lower 
probability of the bank going insolvent and greater bank stability (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
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We estimate the following regression to test the association between 
reclassification choice and analyst forecast dispersion (Disp): 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
_Disp IASamend Size Surprise Fin stability Horizon
Stdroe Comlaw Disc
     
   
     
   
       (2) 
 
To the extent that the reclassification decision by banks increases the 
complexity of the forecasting task for financial analysts, we expect to observe higher 
dispersion of earnings forecasts for banks that reclassify relative to banks that do not 
reclassify financial assets, i.e., we expect a positive coefficient on IASamend.  On the 
other hand, if the reclassification decision decreases the complexity of the forecasting 
task for financial analysts, we expect a negative coefficient on IASamend. 
We estimate equation (2) with country-clustered standard errors to correct for 
cross-sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009). We include the same set of controls as in 
equation (1), with the exception of Loss, Nana and Eps, because the influence of these 
three variables on forecast dispersion lacks theoretical foundation (Behn et al., 2008).   
3.3. Endogeneity between reclassification choice and analyst forecast properties 
Given that the IAS 39 reclassification choice is an endogenous choice, it is 
possible that the same factors driving the choice may also influence analyst forecast 
performance. We use the Heckman two-stage procedure to control for this potential 
endogeneity in the IAS 39 amendment choice. We model the IAS 39 amendment 
choice in the first stage equation, drawing on prior research to identify the variables 
likely to influence the reclassification choice (Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Quali 
and Ricciardi, 2010; Paananen, 2011). These variables include market-to-book ratio 
(MTB), leverage (Lev), size (Size), earnings per share (Eps), and a common law 
indicator (Comlaw). We add Fin_stability as the risk of bank insolvency is likely 
related to the reclassification choice. Lastly, we include disclosure quality index (Disc) 
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to account for differences in disclosure quality across countries in our international 
bank sample.
4
 Based on the prior literature, we expect positive coefficients on Lev, 
Size and Loss and a negative coefficient on Eps. Large banks, banks with higher 
leverage, and less profitable banks are more likely to opt for the reclassification 
choice to minimize the impact on their financial condition. We estimate the following 
selection model:  




DiscComlawEps
stabilityFinLossSizeLevMTBIASamend
876
_543210
          (3) 
 
In the second stage, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) after including the 
inverse Mills ratio from the first stage selection model. 
4. Data and sample 
We begin with the 478 banks from Bankscope that apply IFRS, since our study 
focuses on the accounting choice in IAS 39.
5
 We obtain market data (i.e., market 
capitalization and stock prices) from Datastream. We obtain financial data (i.e., 
shareholder‟s equity, total assets, earnings per share and return on equity) either from 
Bankscope or, by hand-collection, from annual reports to calculate Lev, Fin_stability 
and Stdroe. We exclude banks with missing market and financial data (for example, 
because English versions of the annual reports are unavailable for a few European 
banks). We read the remaining bank annual reports to determine if a bank reclassified 
its financial assets under the 2008 IAS 39 amendment rule. When we apply these 
                                                 
4
 We exclude the variables MTB and Lev that are used in the first stage selection model, from the 
second stage regression. Because these two variables are typically not used in the model with analyst 
forecast accuracy and dispersion as the dependent variable, there is no compelling reason to believe 
that they are related to analyst forecast properties. As suggested by Lennox et al. (2012), we perform 
sensitivity analyses on our first-stage selection model, with either MTB or Lev as the exclusion 
variable. The results are qualitatively similar. 
5
 These countries include Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Netherlands, Norway, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and UK.  
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criteria, the countries with data are limited to Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK. The 
number of banks from these countries is 98.  
We extract analyst forecast data from the I/B/E/S Detail files. Missing analyst 
forecasts, and the requirement of financial data availability for the prior five years for 
calculating Fin_stability and standard deviation of return on equity, further reduce the 
sample to 79 banks. Of these 79 banks, 40 chose the IAS 39 amendment and 39 did 
not.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
In Table 1, we report the sample distribution and mean descriptive statistics of 
firm characteristics by country. Because reclassification data is not available for many 
banks, the number of banks in each country is relatively small, ranging from one 
(Cyprus, Singapore) to eight (Germany and Italy).
6
 We observe considerable variation 
across countries in our two test variables, Accy, and Disp. Forecast accuracy is highest 
in South Africa, Australia and Hong Kong, and lowest in Ireland and Belgium. The 
dispersion of forecasts among financial analysts is greatest in Belgium, UK, and 
Ireland, and least in South Africa and Australia. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 79 banks. 
The mean (median) forecast accuracy (Accy) is -0.034 (-0.016), indicating that the 
mean (median) difference between analyst forecasts and earnings is three (two) 
                                                 
6
 Reclassification information is not available for other Singapore banks.  
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percent of lagged stock price. The mean (median) forecast dispersion (Disp) is 0.065 
(0.035).  
Table 2, Panel B reports mean and median values of the variables used in the 
regression, for banks that chose reclassification and banks that did not, and tests of 
differences in means and medians across these two groups of banks. The mean and 
median Accy for the reclassified banks (IASamend = 1) are significantly (at the 1% 
level) lower than for the banks that did not reclassify (IASamend = 0). We also find 
that the mean and median forecast dispersion (Disp) for the reclassified banks are 
significantly (at the 1% level) higher than the corresponding values for the non-
reclassified banks. 
In terms of the control variables, we find that reclassified banks are larger in 
size (Size), have greater earnings surprise (Surprise), are more likely to report losses 
(Loss), and are more closely followed by analysts (Nana). These significant 
differences suggest that controlling for these bank characteristics is important in our 
multivariate analysis.  
[Insert Table 2] 
We report Pearson correlations between the dependent, independent and control 
variables in Table 3. Forecast accuracy (Accy) and forecast dispersion (Disp) have a 
strong negative correlation of -0.61, showing that the average earnings forecast is less 
accurate when analysts have lower consensus on a bank‟s earnings. The negative 
(positive) correlations between IASamend and Accy (Disp) indicate that analyst 
forecasts are less accurate and have wider dispersion when banks choose to reclassify 
under the IAS 39 amendment option. Analyst forecasts are also less accurate and have 
wider dispersion when earnings surprise is larger and when banks incur losses as 
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indicated by the negative (positive) correlation between Surprise, Loss and Accy 
(Disp). 
[Insert Table 3] 
5.2. IAS 39 amendment choice and analyst forecast accuracy/dispersion 
 We report the results for the first-stage selection model in table 4. The 
exclusion variables MTB and Lev are statistically significant. The results indicate that 
low growth banks and high leverage banks are more likely to have reclassified out of 
fair value. The coefficient on Size is positive and significant, suggesting that larger 
banks are more likely to reclassify. These results are largely consistent with prior 
literature. For example, Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) report a significant negative 
coefficient on MTB and a positive coefficient on Size, and Paananen (2011) finds that 
the coefficient on the capital adequacy ratio (an inverse measure of leverage) is 
negative and significant. However, we find that the coefficients on Loss and Eps are 
statistically insignificant, similar to the findings in Paananen (2011). We include the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from the selection model in the second-stage regression 
model. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The main multivariate results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 presents 
forecast accuracy results for banks that opted to reclassify financial assets versus 
banks that did not opt for reclassification. In Model 1, we report the coefficients of 
our main variable, IASamend, and of the bank-level controls, but without including 
IMR as an additional independent variable. The coefficient on IASamend is negative 
and statistically significant at 5%, indicating that analyst forecasts are less accurate 
when banks reclassify assets from trading to available-for-sale/held-to-maturity or 
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from available-for-sale to held-to-maturity categories under the IAS 39 amendment 
option. We next examine the economic size of the coefficient on IASamend. Banks 
that reclassify financial assets, compared to banks that do not, experience lower 
forecast accuracy of about 2.5% of lagged stock price. This reduction in forecast 
accuracy is non-trivial as it represents about 74% of the mean forecast accuracy 
(0.034) for the sample banks.  
In Model 2, we include the IMR computed from the first-stage selection model 
as an additional independent variable. The coefficient on IMR is positive and 
significant, suggesting potential endogeneity between reclassification choice and 
analyst forecast accuracy.
7
 Nevertheless, even after controlling for the potential 
endogeneity, the coefficient on IASamend is still negative and statistically significant 
at 10%.
8
 Overall, the results reported in Table 5 are consistent with the view that the 
reclassification decision reduces the predictability of earnings, and hence weakens the 
ability of analysts to forecast accurately. The evidence suggests that forecast accuracy 
is lower for banks that reclassified their financial assets compared to banks that did 
not. 
For the control variables, the coefficient on Loss is negative and significant 
while the coefficient on Nana is positive and significant, indicating that it is relatively 
more difficult for analysts to forecast loss-making banks and that more analyst 
coverage tends to improve forecast accuracy. These results are consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996). For the country-level controls, consistent 
                                                 
7
 As suggested by Lennox et al. (2012), multicollinearity can arise even when the exclusion variables 
are valid. We therefore conduct diagnostic tests for multicollinearity and report the findings here. In 
Model 1, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for IASamend is 1.59. In Model 2, the VIFs for IASamend 
and IMR are 1.63 and 1.72, respectively. Overall, there is no strong evidence that multicollinearity is 
driving the results.  
8
 The economic size of the coefficient on IASamend is non-trivial. The reduction in forecast accuracy 
for banks that reclassified compared to banks that did not is about 65% of the mean forecast accuracy 
(0.034) for the sample banks.  
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with prior studies (e.g., Chang et al., 2000; Barniv et al., 2005), the coefficient on 
Comlaw is positive, although it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Disc is 
positive and significant at 5% level, indicating that analyst forecasts are more accurate 
when the information environment in the country is richer. This result is consistent 
with the finding of Hope (2003).  
[Insert Table 5] 
We report the results for the relation between banks‟ reclassification choice 
and analyst forecast dispersion in Table 6.  The key results largely mirror those of 
Table 5. The coefficient estimate on IASamend is positive and statistically significant 
at 5% in both Model 1 and Model 2 (i.e., without and with the inclusion of IMR as an 
additional independent variable in the regression model). The economic size of the 
coefficient on IASamend is non-trivial in both models. In Model 1, the forecast 
dispersion for banks that reclassify financial assets, compared to banks that do not 
reclassify, is larger by about 4.9% of lagged stock price. This larger dispersion 
represents about 75% of the mean forecast dispersion (0.065) for the sample banks. In 
Model 2, the larger dispersion represents about 65% of the mean forecast dispersion 
for the sample banks.
9
 
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 show that analyst forecast dispersion is 
wider for banks that opted to reclassify under the IAS 39 amendment choice. The 
evidence is consistent with the view that the reclassification of non-derivatives 
impedes analyst forecasting ability.      
[Insert Table 6] 
                                                 
9
 As before, we conduct diagnostic tests for multicollinearity. In model 1, the Variance-Inflation-Factor 
(VIF) for IASamend is 1.43. In model 2, VIFs for IASamend and IMR are 1.52 and 1.63, respectively. 
We thus conclude that multicollinearity is unlikely to drive our main results.  
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5.3. Sensitivity analysis 
We perform several robustness checks and discuss the un-tabulated results in 
this section.  In our first robustness check, we use an alternative measure to capture 
the effects of reclassification on financial statements. This measure, which we denote 
as IAS39amount, is the amount of financial assets reclassified from trading to AFS 
and from AFS to held-to-maturity, scaled by total assets. The overall results, although 
weaker, are largely consistent with the results in tables 5 and 6. In the forecast 
accuracy test, the coefficient on IAS39amount is negative and significant at the 1% 
level (two-tailed), suggesting that forecast accuracy decreases as the reclassified 
amount increases, consistent with the results reported in Table 5. In the forecast 
dispersion test, the coefficient on IAS39amount is positive, consistent with the results 
in Table 6, and indicates that forecast dispersion is larger for banks that reclassified a 
larger amount. However, unlike the results for IAS39amend in Table 6, the coefficient 
on IAS39amount is not statistically significant.  
In our second robustness check, we repeat the same analysis for the post-
adoption period, 2010. Our results show that, in the fiscal year 2010, both analyst 
forecast accuracy and dispersion are not significantly associated with reclassification 
choice. This finding is perhaps not surprising as the economic environment in the year 
2010 is less volatile than in 2009, and indicates that the forecasting ability of analysts 
improves as the environment becomes more stable.
10
   
In our main analysis, we compute forecast accuracy (and dispersion) for 
2009, immediately after the release of actual 2008 earnings, which incorporate the 
                                                 
10
 Another reason that may partially explain the improvement in the analyst forecasting ability in 2010 
relative to 2009 is that, in 2008, some assets were reclassified from trading to available-for-sale. Fair 
value changes of these assets were reclassified as Other Comprehensive Income (OCI), which are 
typically not used as inputs by analysts in making forecasts. In the subsequent year  when economic 
conditions improve, these assets were sold and the fair value changes have been transferred from OCI 
to earnings, which will be used by analysts to make earnings forecasts. 
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effects of the reclassifications. Our third robustness check is to measure accuracy 
using the latest forecasts issued before the release of 2009 actual earnings to test our 
prediction. The results show that our inferences remain unchanged although the 
results are statistically weaker. The coefficients on IAS39amend for the forecast 
accuracy and forecast dispersion tests are both significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
with IMR as an additional independent variable in the regression models.
11
 
6. Conclusion 
 Our study examines how the choice by banks to use measurements other 
than fair value to reclassify non-derivative financial assets permitted under the 
amendment to IAS 39, affects the properties of financial analysts‟ earnings forecasts. 
We find that the reclassification choice reduced analyst earnings forecast accuracy 
and increased forecast dispersion one year following the reclassification. These results 
are robust to controlling for factors, such as firm size, forecast horizon, analyst 
following, and other characteristics that have been shown to affect analyst forecast 
properties, and also to controlling for the potential endogeneity in the IAS 39 
amendment decision by banks. We also find the observed decline in analyst 
forecasting ability is limited to the year of adoption when the economic environment 
was highly volatile.  
 One interpretation of this evidence is that the reclassification reduces the 
ability of financial analysts to predict earnings during a period of heightened 
uncertainty induced by the financial crisis. However, as the economic conditions in 
the subsequent period improve, analysts understand and incorporate the reporting 
changes due to the IAS amendment rule in their earnings forecasts. This interpretation 
                                                 
11
 The coefficients (t-values) on IAS39amend for the forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion tests are 
-0.0155 (-1.79) and 0.0100 (1.86) respectively. 
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is supported by our finding that the deterioration in analyst forecasts is observed only 
in the first year of adoption when the banking sector was highly volatile, but not in the 
post-adoption year.  
We recommend caution in interpreting the results of our study, because the 
relatively small sample size used limits the generalizability. Notwithstanding this 
caveat, the effects of the reclassification choice on earnings predictability by financial 
analysts provide interesting insights to regulators around the world in assessing the 
costs and benefits of the amendment to IAS 39. We document that the negative effect 
of the amendment rule on analyst behaviour is transitory and represents a one-time 
shock to analysts‟ forecasting ability without a long-lasting effect.  
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Table 1 
 Mean values of bank characteristics by country 
Country 
No. of 
banks Accy Disp Size Surprise Loss Nana Fin_stability Horizon Stdroe Eps  Comlaw Disc 
Australia 3 -0.002 0.006 9.854 0.012 0.000 2.962 4.446 5.324 0.022 1.907 1.000 0.750 
Austria 2 -0.016 0.040 9.315 0.151 0.000 3.322 3.258 5.133 0.038 2.420 0.000 0.250 
Belgium 2 -0.120 0.183 9.491 0.281 0.500 3.257 3.908 5.187 0.025 -4.828 0.000 0.420 
Cyprus 1 -0.014 0.041 8.344 0.141 0.000 2.708 2.195 5.193 0.118 0.576 0.000 0.330 
Denmark 5 -0.060** 0.057 7.189 0.078 0.200 1.317 3.659 4.971 0.029 1.823 0.000 0.580 
Finland 2 -0.018 0.028 9.265 0.046 0.000 2.916 4.306 5.375 0.046 0.902 0.000 0.500 
France 4 -0.021* 0.022 9.667 0.044 0.000 2.773 3.672 5.201 0.047 2.569 0.000 0.750 
Germany 8 -0.026*** 0.051 7.568 0.161 0.125 2.704 3.127 5.215 0.074 1.705 0.000 0.420 
Greece 3 -0.093 0.084 8.158 0.203 0.333 2.991 3.244 5.312 0.079 -0.783 0.000 0.330 
Hong Kong 4 -0.003* 0.024 8.083 0.024 0.000 2.613 4.000 5.447 0.031 0.389 1.000 0.920 
Ireland 2 -0.146 0.403 7.533 0.145 1.000 2.890 2.962 5.760 0.068 -1.696 1.000 0.670 
Italy 8 -0.021*** 0.027 8.368 0.056 0.000 2.789 3.698 5.250 0.083 0.554 0.000 0.670 
Netherlands 3 -0.016 0.060 8.409 0.211 0.000 2.868 3.380 5.106 0.079 0.681 0.000 0.500 
Norway 7 -0.045** 0.058 6.796 0.119 0.000 2.069 3.309 5.202 0.041 0.745 0.000 0.580 
Singapore 1 -0.016 0.017 10.128 0.034 0.000 3.091 3.559 5.318 0.030 0.630 1.000 1.000 
South Africa 3 -0.000* 0.000 9.484 0.000 0.000 2.538 3.501 5.295 0.050 1.258 1.000 0.830 
Spain 6 -0.028** 0.038 9.481 0.051 0.000 3.086 3.486 5.225 0.042 1.615 0.000 0.500 
Sweden 2 -0.066 0.072   9.453 0.341 0.500 3.496 3.990 5.290 0.027 0.371 0.000 0.580 
Switzerland 6 -0.020** 0.027 8.293 0.185 0.167 2.792 2.990 5.257 0.069  6.967 0.000 0.670   
Turkey 2 -0.016 0.035 9.027 0.015 0.000 2.697 2.549 5.193 0.260 0.340 0.000 0.500 
UK 5 -0.042** 0.241 9.718 0.254 0.400 3.069 3.106 5.219 0.095 10.882 1.000 0.830 
 
This table reports mean values of bank characteristic variables by country. Comlaw and Disc are country-level 
variables. Definitions of the variables are as follows:  
Accy 
Disp 
IASamend 
Size 
Surprise 
Loss 
Nana 
Fin_stability  
 
Horizon 
Stdroe 
Eps 
Comlaw 
Disc 
 
Accuracy of analysts‟ earnings forecasts winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
Dispersion of analysts‟ earnings forecasts winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
IAS 39 amendment choice indicator that equals 1 when selected, 0 otherwise 
Natural logarithm of equity market value  
Change in earnings deflated by stock price winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
Loss indicator that equals 1 when the bank earnings is negative, 0  otherwise 
Natural logarithm of number of analysts following the bank  
Natural logarithm of [(return on assets plus capital assets) divided by standard deviation of return on 
asset over 2003 to 2007] winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
Natural logarithm of mean forecast horizon for 2009 earnings 
Standard deviation of earnings over 2003 to 2007 winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
Earnings per share winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
Common law indicator that equals 1 for common law countries, 0 for code law countries 
Disclosure requirement in equity offerings reported in La Porta 2006 
 
 ***, **, * indicate (two-tailed) significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the pooled sample 
 
Panel A: Full sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median Skewness 
Accy -0.034 0.053 -0.267 -0.000 -0.016 -2.881 
Disp 0.065 0.123 0.000 0.763 0.035 4.756 
IASamend 0.506 0.503 0.000 1.000 1.000 -0.025 
Size 8.501 1.835 4.253 12.203  8.344 -0.106 
Surprise 0.118 0.165 0.000 0.654 0.049 1.964 
Loss 0.127 0.335 0.000 1.000 0.000 2.246 
Nana 2.711 0.937 0.000 3.912 2.944 -1.164 
Fin_stability 3.450 0.883 1.458 5.090 3.548 -0.319 
Horizon 5.241 0.198 4.127 6.242 5.236 -0.600 
Stdroe 0.062 0.085 0.009 0.502 0.037 3.834 
Eps 1.969 7.103 -10.394 36.675 0.747 3.581 
Comlaw 0.228 0.422 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.298 
Disc 0.607 0.169 0.250 1.000  0.580 0.110 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics IAS 39 amendment adopters and non-adopters 
 
Variable 
Adopters 
(n=40) 
Non-adopters 
(n=39) 
Difference 
Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-stat 
Accy -0.051 -0.020 -0.017 -0.011 2.883*** 2.898*** 
Disp 0.102 0.050 0.027 0.019 -2.820*** -4.329*** 
Size 9.054 9.174 7.935 7.565 -2.830*** -2.677*** 
Surprise 0.189 0.110 0.045 0.020 -4.293*** -4.398*** 
Loss 0.250 0.000  0.000 0.000 -3.560*** -3.320*** 
Nana 3.077 3.332 2.336 2.565 -3.807*** -4.023*** 
Fin_stability 3.473 3.464 3.426 3.640 -0.233 -0.103 
Horizon 5.257 5.236 5.226 5.252 -0.688 0.574 
Stdroe 0.056 0.034 0.068 0.042 0.637 0.780 
Eps 1.122 0.603 2.837  0.859 1.074 2.182** 
Comlaw  0.200 0.000 0.256 0.000 0.591 0.594 
Disc 0.589 0.580 0.625 0.580 0.930 0.808 
 
This table reports descriptive ststistics for the variables used in the regressions. Detailed definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate (two-tailed) significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
          
 Accy Disp IASamend Size Surprise Loss Nana Fin_stability Horizon Stdroe Eps Comlaw 
Accy 1.00            
Disp -0.61** 1.00           
IASamend -0.32** 0.31** 1.00          
Size 0.09 0.07 0.31** 1.00         
Surprise -0.30** 0.42** 0.44** 0.13 1.00        
Loss -0.62** 0.59** 0.38** 0.06 0.40** 1.00       
Nana 0.15 0.11 0.40** 0.75** 0.24** 0.08 1.00      
Fin_stabilityy 0.27** -0.15 0.03 0.20 -0.16 -0.24** 0.10 1.00     
Horizon -0.24** 0.41** 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.31** -0.02 1.00    
Stdroe -0.13 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.71** 0.03 1.00   
Eps 0.15 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.33** -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 0.12 1.00  
Comlaw 0.05 0.24** -0.07 0.18 -0.07 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.34** -0.05 0.12 1.00 
Disc 0.17 0.04 -0.11 0.14 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.21 -0.06 0.16 0.72** 
    
This table reports correlations among the variables used in the regressions. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.  
The number of observations is 79. ** indicates (two-tailed) significance at 5%.  
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Table 4 
First stage selection model for IAS 39 amendment 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Dependent Variable: IASamend 
  Coefficient Wald-statistic 
Intercept ? -32.7353 (4.60)** 
MTB ? -2.0455 (6.35)*** 
Lev + 33.4162 (4.21)** 
Size + 0.4230 (4.31)** 
Loss + 26.8731 (0.01) 
Fin_stability ? -0.1484 (0.11) 
Eps - -0.0252 (0.13) 
Comlaw ? -0.0000 (0.00) 
Disc ? 0.8338 (0.09) 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.5870 
Obs.  79 
 
This table reports estimation results for the following probit model:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8
_IASamend MTB Lev Size Loss Fin stability Eps
Comlaw Disc
      
  
      
  
 
where MTB is market-to-book ratio; Lev is leverage measured as debt divided by total assets. Each 
variable is winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Other variables are as defined in Table 1. Wald chi-squares 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate (two-tailed) significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     
  
31 
 
Table 5 
Association between IAS 39 amendment choice and Forecast Accuracy  
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.3433 (1.20) 0.3437 (1.22) 
IASamend - -0.0246 (-2.06)** -0.0220 (-1.94)* 
Size ? -0.0057 (-1.48) -0.0058 (-1.72)* 
Surprise - -0.0132 (-0.41) -0.0129 (-0.38) 
Loss - -0.0793 (-3.06)*** -0.0733 (-2.72)*** 
Nana + 0.0300 (3.76)*** 0.0344 (3.56)*** 
Fin_stability + 0.0020 (0.37) 0.0035 (0.56) 
Horizon - -0.0819 (-1.49) -0.0863 (-1.56) 
Stdroe - -0.0440 (-0.77) -0.0572 (-0.87) 
Eps ? -0.0006 (-1.16) -0.0004 (-0.86) 
Comlaw 
+ 
0.0085 (0.68) 0.0075 (0.59) 
Disc + 0.0618 (2.22)** 0.0625 (2.36)** 
IMR ?   0.0028 (2.12)** 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.5043 0.5136 
Obs.  79 79 
 
This table reports estimation results for the following model:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
_Accy IASamend Size Surprise Loss Nana Fin stability
Horizon Stdroe Eps Comlaw Disc IMR
      
      
      
      
 
Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. IMR is inverse Mills ratio derived from the 
first-stage probit regression in Table 4. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate (two-
tailed) significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
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Table 6 
Association between IAS 39 amendment choice and Forecast Dispersion  
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -1.0445 (-1.26) -1.0469 (-1.27) 
IASamend + 0.0491 (2.21)** 0.0422 (2.14)** 
Size ? 0.0012 (0.21) 0.0014 (0.26) 
Surprise - 0.2563 (1.42) 0.2495 (1.35) 
Nana + -0.0257 (-1.63) -0.0331 (-1.92)* 
Fin_stability + -0.0135 (-0.95) -0.0151 (-1.09) 
Horizon - 0.2327 (1.38) 0.2399 (1.42) 
Stdroe - -0.0478 (-0.46) -0.0208 (-0.20) 
Comlaw 
- 
0.0856 (2.11)** 0.0848 (2.06)** 
Disc - -0.1250 (-1.46) -0.1249 (-1.48) 
IMR ?   -0.0052 (-1.87)* 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.3367 0.3380 
Obs.  79 79 
 
This table reports estimation results for the following model:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
_Disp IASamend Size Surprise Nana Fin stability Horizon
Stdroe Comlaw Disc IMR
      
    
      
    
 
Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. IMR is inverse Mills ratio derived from 
the first-stage probit regression in Table 4. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
(two-tailed) significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
